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IN THE COURT 
OF THE STATE UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
LONNIE FERRIS LAWSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
Case No. 19106 
OF THF NATURE OF TFE CASE 
Defendant Lonnie Ferris Lawson was convicted by a verdict 
before Judge James s. Sawaya of criminal homicide, automobile 
homicide, a third degree felonv, and also convicted of driving 
under the influence of alcohol causing bodilv injury, a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
DISPOSITION IN THF LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before Judge James S. Sawaya. After a 
verdict of guilty was returned, Judge Sawaya sentenced Lawson to 
a sentence of zero to five years on the homicide charge and one 
year on the Class A Misdemeanor; granted a stav of execution for 
two years conditioned on (1) defendant serve one year in the Salt 
Lake County Jail; (2) the court retain jurisdiction; (3) pay resti-
tution as recommended bv 11.dul t Probation anc' Parole; ( 4) maintain 
full time employment after jail term sentence; (5) enter and com-
plete alcohol program or any other program deemed appropriate 
by Adult Probation and Parole; (6) consume no aocohol or freauent 
places where alcohol is sold; (7) take antabuse if deemed appro-
priate. 
Judge Sawaya sentenced Lawson on Count II, driving under 
the influence of alcohol causing bodilv injury, to one vear in 
the County Jail to run concurrently with Count I, granted a stav 
of execution for two years and placed defendant on Probation under 
the same conditions as Count I. 
From these sentences defendant filed tinelv notice of 
appeal. 
RELIEF 01'' APPEAL 
Defendant on appeal seeks reversal of the verdicts and 
dismissal, or in the alternative, reversal and a new trial. 
OF 
Clinton Hepner testified (T. 2-35) that on nctober S, 
around 7:00 p.m., he picked up his brother's 2807, Datsun which 
he had had in his possession for four months hut had stored in 
his parents' garage for the last two and one-half months. The 
Datsun would not start so he jump started it and picked up his 
girlfriend, Kelly Fehler. Lights on the Datsun were not 
They had dinner at the Hawaiian, and after leavina the restaur3n' 
driving to his apartment the car snuttered. He stated that whc 
the car sputtered he shifted down to low RPMs, 
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hit the throttle all the wav. He claimed he was doing this to 
get the car going and not hot-rodding it. 
When he left the apartment two or three hours later, 
the Datsun again would not start. He and Kelly had to push start 
it--he pushing and Kelly at the wheel. switched sides, with 
Hepner at the wheel and drove to get some gas, thinking that water 
in the gas tank was one of the problems in the car and that more 
gas would alleviate this. 
He then drove the Datsun onto the freeway at the 9th South 
entrance heading towards Sandy. Neither he nor Kelly wore seat-
belts. Though heading for Sandy, he found he had to exit at 33d 
South because the Datsun had killed again, While on I-15 he pulled 
over to the emergency lane. He had been doino 60 MPH on I-15 
(T. 15), and was aware of the problems with the power, battery and 
gas (T. 29). 
Once in the emergency lane, he stated that he used his 
right hand to stop by pulling the emergencv handbrake, used his 
left hand to turn off the lights and steered with his kneew (T. 16). 
Coming to a complete stop is the last event he remembers that even-
ing. Hepner testified his foot was on the brake, so his brake 
lights were on, but on cross-examination he stated that he had no 
lights on the dash inside the car, so he did not know if the brake 
lights or directional signal lights were working from the point on 
I-15 ,,,here the Datsun's motor killed nor at the time of the acci-
dent. 
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Orville Peterson testified 35) that on October 8, 
as he entered I-80 westbound at 20th South to pick up I-15 headed 
south, he observed a Blazer passing him on the left. He was going 
about 50 MPH and let the Blazer pass. He then picked up his speed 
on I-15 and saw the Blazer 100 to 150 feet ahead of him and it 
remained the same distance away until it exited at 33d South. 
Thereafter, he saw a cloud of dust and saw the Blazer roll. He 
parked his car north of the Blazer which was cross-wise and upside 
down in the road. He saw a man get out of the Blazer window who 
appeared dazed and wastalkingunintelligiblv and calling out 
names which made him think someone else had been thrown out of the 
Blazer. He than saw the Datsun down by a gullv near a fence, right 
side up and facing north, with a male in the driver's seat and 
another person in the passenger seat. 
Peterson stated he saw the Blazer signal properly as 
it changed lanes to go on I-15 from I-80 and also saw the Blazer 
use proper directionals as it exited at 33d South. He stated he 
saw no other car exiting on 33d South and did not observe the num-
ber of people in the Blazer. 
There was conflicting testimony as 1 to the position of the 
female passenger in the Datsun. Mr. Peterson believed her head 
was in the lap of the driver. Jay Bringhurst, one sho stopped tc 
give aid, thought she was leaning back against the passenger seat 
Vern Olsen, a police officer, thouqht she was leaning over to the 
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left side by the steering wheel, He did not see her head by 
the clutch pedal. Two paramedics thought her head was near the 
steering column by the clutch pedal. Initially, Stephanie 
Demetropolis, an emergency medical technician, stopped at the acci-
dent, took pulse and blood pressure of the passenger (T. 187). 
She testified the blood pressure and pulse were normal though on 
a second taking of the blood pressure there was a slight change; 
the systolic and diastolic readings were slightly closer together 
(T. 194, 199, 201). 
Dr. Robert Hood testifiec that he was a qualified neuro-
surgeon on call for St. Mark's Hospital on October 9, 1983. Two 
patients were brought in around 12:45 a.m. who, he was informed, 
had been involved in the same traffic accident. 
Upon examining the female patient, he stated she had 
irregular, shallow breathing, did not respond to verbal or painful 
stimuli and was in an extremely deep coma (T. 79). There was no 
evidence of cuts or bruises and no internal bleeding. A tube was 
inserted in her air passageway to aic breathing together with 
the assistance of ventilation from the respiratory therapy crew, 
and she was given medications because he, Dr. Hood, assumed she 
had massive injuries to the head. The diagnosis of massive 
injury to the head was based upon neurogenic pulmonarv edema, 
Results of the CAT scan and cervical spine x-ray showed 
there was a subdural hematoma, on the left side surface 
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of the brain, but no damage to the gaps and inner spinular gaos 
in the muscular structure of the spine. There were no broken 
ribs or injury to the bony structure in the area of the edema 
in the lungs. 
Dr. Hood's conclusion was, since there was no visible 
injury (T. 84), that the patient suffered injury to the nerve 
cells in the brain and the brain stem, the lower part of the 
brain that connects to the spinal cord where respiratory and 
cardiac functions are generated. There was no postmortem examina-
tion or autopsy. He, Dr. Hood, concluded that the patient had 
forcible movement caused by some shearing force as a result of 
a sudden deceleration. 
On cross-examination Dr. Hood testified that the subdural 
hematoma was not sufficient in itself to cause death. He also 
stated that such hematoma could rarely be caused by an aneurysm 
and death could have been caused by destruction of the medulla. 
From his examinations he could not tell if the medulla was de-
stroyed. The damaged medulla could not be caused by a whiplash. 
In summary, Dr. Hood could not testify as to the direction of the 
trauma to the head and could onlv say that from the CAT scan and 
and neurological examination it was a massive trauma to the brair 
causing brain contusion and injury but he could not identifv the 
nature of the trauma (T. 86-87). 
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Over objection by defense counsel (T. 233-244) inclu-
sive testimony of Belka was received and the blood sample admitted 
into evidence. 
Lloyd Belka testified he was the Highway Patrol officer 
dispatched to the scene on October 8 around midnight. When he 
arrived there were four people about 30 feet from the Blazer. He 
asked thedefendant for identification and observed him to be a 
bit confused, disoriented and sMelled the odor of alcohol. He 
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He stated the deFennant had slurred soeech, which mav have been 
the result of a laceration to the chin which was subseauentlv 
sutured at the St. Mark's Hospital. He also stated the defendant 
staggered and he did not believe this was caused by bruises to 
the knees (T. 264, 275). 
At this point Belk2 took the defendant to his, Belka's, 
vehicle and told him to remain there while he went down to see 
the Datsun. He radioed for extra helo and then accompanied defen-
dant to St. Mark's Hospital. Belka stated that Mr. Peterson 
out that defendant was the driver of the Blazer, but on cross-
examination T. 261), said "Ir. Peterson never told him the defendan· 
was driving the Blazer. No one saw the defendant drivinq the Blaze 
(T. 262). No alcohol was discovered in the 8lazer; no 
warnings were given the defendant. Defendant was no longer free 
to go at 12:12 a.m. Sgt. Belka aave consent to draw blood from 
the defendant at 1:18 a.rn. (T. 272) and Miranda warnings were sub-
sequently given by Belka at 1;30 a.rn. The Blazer was reaistered 
in defendant's name (T. 27). 
Blood was allegedlv drawn from defendant by Kav Fowler, 
a qualified RN, though she could not identify the defendant in 
court nor did she know from where the blood was drawn, nor did she 
have any knowledge as to the nul'\.her of vials of blood nrawn. Pre·' 
, cutor Harwood attempted to refresh her memorv frol". the transcrli·' 
of the oreliminarv hearina 117). 
- 'l -
Q: After having it, does it refresh your 
recollection as to the proceeding? 
A: Not to this particular case. I am in court 
al 1 the time; I am. sorrv. I can't remember 
one case from another. 
Thereafter, William Stonebraker, Toxicologist for the 
Utah State Toxicology Department, testified to the results of a 
blood test purportedly the blood test of the defendant's. He 
stated there were two tubes of blood (T. 427) and he did the 
blood alcohol determination from one tube (T. 430) by means 
of a gas chromatograph. He received two results. They were 
.141 and .151 percentage of alcohol oer 100 cc. (T. 435). The 
chromatograph was calibrated. The standard deviation for the known 
solution of .077 was .002 (T. 436, 440), and the standard devia-
tion for the known solution of .197 was .005 (T. 436, 442). He 
ran the two samples of blood with 23 other specimens. 
Dr. Brian Finkle took the stand. He testified he was a 
qualified toxicologist, Director of the Center for Human Toxi-
co logy, emploved by the University of Utah '1edical Center. He 
stated that with such a discrepancy of results (.141 and .151) 
and the standard deviations testified to by he 
would throw out both test results and run another one as the varia-
tion on the two tests was not within either the standard devia-
tion below, to-wit, .007 with a .002 deviation or a .197 with a 
maximum deviation of .005. Quoting the testimonv at T. 482: 
Q. bv Hatch: But to check my memory, vour 
answer is you wouldn't accept 
those basises. You would run 
another. Is that correct? 
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Q: Given them just as you have presented them 
to me, I would have repeated that analvsis. 
A: Once or twice? In other words .... 
Q: If the fundamental concept of those standards 
is wrong, it wouldn't matter if I did it one 
hundred times. I would still get an unaccept-
able answer. The point of mv lenqthy answer 
to your question is that there should be a 
continuum of error, analvtical error shown 
with the line I drew. Then at any level you 
could see whether the test is within or with-
out those limitations. 
He also testified that the gas chromatograph is a corn-
petent means of testing blood for alcohol given the provisions 
that the test is done by somone who is qualified, that the equip-
ment is proper and proper procedure is followed (T. 472). 
Defendant made obiection to the admission of the blood 
test run by Mr. Stonebraker on the basis of the State's expert 
witness, Dr. Finkle. The motion was denied. Both sides rested. 
Defendant made a motion for directed verdict which was 
denied by the court. 
counts. 
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged on both 
POINT I 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVF.RSIBLE ERROR 
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUr-'.BER 18 WHICP 
PREJUDICED THE RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Instructions in a criminal case must be accurate based 
and based on the essential elements of the offense charged and 
failure to do so is reversible error, State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 
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Instruction number 18 on the negligence of another 
party either nullifies subsequent instructions number 20 and 
21 on proximate cause, or in the alternative, confuses the 
jury. 
Instruction number 18 states that is no defense that 
any victim may have been negligent in one or more respects and 
thereby contributed to the cause of the accident (R. 084). 
The above instruction precludes the jury from considering any 
victim as being a proximate cause of injury and/or death. By 
his own testimony Clinton Hepner stated he took the Datsun onto 
the freeway I-15 after he had to jump start it and thereafter 
push start it. The Datsun Sputtered. All of this occurred 
and he still chose to take the automobile onto the freeway at 
night. He stated that after the car killed on the freeway he 
did not have lights on the dash, he drove onto the emergency 
lane by steering with his knees, braking with his right hand 
and turning off the lights, if there were any, by his left hand. 
In light of the above actions, to preclude the jury 
from considering him as the proximate cause of the accident 
cannot be warranted by the evidence. 
The court gave instruction number 18 wherein it states: 
"In the crimes of automobile homicide and driving 
under the influence of alcohol causing bodily 
injury it is no defense that any victim may also 
have been negligent in one or more respects and 
thereby also contributed to the cause of the acci-
dent. The test to be applied is whether you find 
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from all facts that the defendant was neqli-
gent and that said negligence caused the-death 
of Kelly Fehler and proximately caused the 
injuries to Clinton Hepner." 
Thereafter, the court gave instruction number 19, a 
stock instruction, that no inference may arise from the fact 
that an unfortunate and fatal accident happened. Then, the 
court gave the defendant's request number 4 as instruction 
number 20, a stock instruction on proximate cause. 
Instruction number 21 sets forth as follows: 
"If you find that defendant was negligent and 
that the proximate cause of the alleged harm was 
an independent intervening act of a person not 
a party to this case, that the defendant in the 
exercise of ordinary care could not reasonably 
have anticipated as likely to happen, the defen-
dant's original negligence is superseded by the 
intervening act and is not the proximate cause 
of the alleged harm. However, if in the exer-
cise of ordinary care the defendant should 
reasonably have anticipated the intervening act, 
it does not supersede his original negligence 
or break the chain of proximate causation." 
It is pointed out that Mr. Hepner, though a victim, was 
not a party to this case, parties being the State of Utah and 
the defendant. This Court has as recently as State v. Ruben, 
663 P.2d 445, reiterated that instructions should not be con-
sidered in isolation in order to predicate a claiM of error 
upon it, but instructions must be read and stand as a connected 
whole. It seems difficult to read the two instructions, to-wit, 
18 and 20, supra, without confusion arising in the mind of 
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reading them, especially jurors not legally trained. As the 
Ruben case, supra, points out, the jury must be given some 
guide as to how and when the drinking of intoxicants constitutes 
simple negligence. Agreeing that this being a criminal case 
does not come under the comparative negligence doctrine, there 
must be some instruction as to when the imbibing of alcohol 
becomes simple negligence. The writer contends that the only 
way the jury could read instructions 18 and 20 together would 
require them to not consider at all the court's proper instruc-
tion on proximate cause. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWHJG THE RESULTS 
OF THE BLOOD TEST TO GO TO THE JURY. 
In reading the testimony of the toxicologist William 
Stonebraker, who received the vial of blood and tested it, he 
ran two tests on the sample along with 23 other samples not re-
lated to the case. One sample ran .141 and the other sample 
.151. He further testified that the standards which at that time 
were run on the gas chromatograph apparatus allowed deviations 
for a valid test of less than the .01 deviation which resulted 
from his two tests of the blood. Mr. Stonebraker in testifying 
as to the tolerances established at the laboratory in which he 
worked, at pages 436 and 437 and again on cross-examination at 
pages 442 through 450, stated that thev used standards of .072 
to .082 for the low control and .185 to .209 for the high con-
trol. They had no controls in the area wherein the samples 
- 13 -
of the defendant's blood fell. He admitted that the laboratory's 
margin of error is .05% which would make the standard deviation 
for the low control .002 and the standard deviation for the high 
control .005, and further, at line 2, T. 443: 
Q: Well, the difference between your .141 
and your .151 is in excess of your devi-
ation allowance; is it not? 
A: Not for these controls which we figured 
the standard deviation on. 
Q: Low control is .002; is that correct? 
A: Well, at any rate, the low figure was 
reported. 
Q: That is not what I am talking about. I 
am talking about your standard deviation. 
A: I don't figure a standard deviation on 
the unknown specimen, sir. 
The State called Dr. Brian Finkle as an expert witness 
on toxicology and alcohol in the blood. Dr. Finkle, after being 
given hypothetical questions as to the standards and variations, 
testified to concluding that if the tests were over the varia-
tions, the proper laboratory procedure would be to throw out 
both tests and run another (T. 479). Despite this testimony 
the court, over objection, allowed the lower of the blood alcohol 
tests into evidence. 
The State recalled toxicologist Stonebraker to try and 
rectify his testimony as to their laboratory standards (T. 491, 
etc.); however, the State was unable to lay a foundation to admit 
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the standards brought with him into evidence leaving the testi-
mony of the State's witness, Brian Finkle, to the basis that he 
would not admit the lower of the two tests run by Stonebraker, 
to-wit, .141 and .151, but would have to run them over to get 
an acceptable blood alcohol. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PUTTING THE DEFEN-
DANT BEHIND THE WHEEL OF THE CAR AT ANY 
TIME. 
Mr. Peterson, the first witness at the scene, was unable 
to identify the person he saw crawling out of the car (T. 44): 
Q: Would you recognize the person if you 
saw him again? 
A: I couldn't certify if I could. No. 
And at T. 51: 
Q: I see. You didn't get a good enough view 
of the person and you couldn't identify 
him? 
A: That is correct. 
Mr. Peterson also talked about the person he saw coming 
out of the car asking where two other people were, indicating 
there had been more than one person occupying the car at the time 
of the accident. 
Mr. Jay Bringhurst testified that he saw a person he 
identified as the defendant crawling out of the window of the 
car 53), but never identified that person as the defendant 
and never saw hiM driving the car or in control of the automo-
bile. 
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Sgt. Belka indicated that Mr. Peterson had pointed 
out the defendant as the driver of the automobile but stated 
on cross-examination that Peterson had not pointed him out as 
the driver, see T. 219: 
Q: Who was it who attracted your attention to 
him (the defendant)? 
A: Orville Peterson. 
Q: The same Orville Peterson who was here in 
court as a witness yesterday? 
A: That is correct. 
Then Belka testified (T. 296) that Mr. Bringhurst and Mr. 
Peterson indicated to him that Mr. Lawson was the man they saw 
in the vehicle but neither indicated they saw him driving. This 
leaves only the statement of Mr. Lawson when Sgt. Belka asked 
if he was driving the vehicle and he answered "Right", and is 
in direct contravention to a long series of cases in Utah 
allowing a person to convict himself by his own confession or 
admission without a prior foundation showing the elements of 
the crime charged. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully requested that the Court consider 
the errors in law herein and reverse and remand for a new trial 
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especially the confusion arising from the instructions as to 
negligence and probable cause. 
u 
DATED this .'2_ (;, - day of September, 198 3. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sumner J. Hatch 
Attorney for D fendant/Appellant 
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